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Abstract
This paper explores the eﬃciency of tradable permit markets for stock pollutants.
With uncertainty about the future stock level or damages, a market with banking and
borrowing is inferior, in terms of eﬃciency, compared to a market without banking
and borrowing if the regulator commits to an initial allocation of permits. This result
occurs because, with banking and borrowing and commitment, the regulator needs
to specify the total allowable amount of emission over time at the initial time period
before the uncertainty with the pollution stock is resolved. An alternative banking
and borrowing scheme is proposed, where the regulator can update the allocation of
permits to ﬁrms over time and achieve the eﬃcient pollution accumulation.
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11 Introduction
As in the case of CO2 emissions, for some pollutants it is the stock, or the accumula-
tion of the emission over the past, rather than the current ﬂow that determines current
damages. This paper studies the eﬃciency of tradable permit markets for a stock pol-
lutant in the presence of uncertainty about the accumulation of the stock of pollution.
In particular, the focus is on the welfare property of intertemporal trade of permits
(banking and borrowing, or B&B). It will be shown that, if the regulator allows the
polluting ﬁrms to bank or borrow permits, then the regulator needs to change the
ﬁrms’ permit endowments at each point in time in order to achieve socially optimal
emission of the pollutant.
For stock pollutants there have been several prior studies on the optimal emission
path (Falk and Mendelsohn 1993, Tahvonen 1995) and on the eﬃciency of tradable
permit markets (Fischer, et al. 1998, Newell and Pizer 1998, Kling and Rubin 1997,
Leiby and Rubin 2001). For tradable permits, a banking and borrowing scheme has
been considered to be a useful policy option since it may allow ﬁrms to reduce the
total present value of pollution abatement cost by reallocating their emissions across
time. Kling and Rubin (1997) analyzed whether allowing for B&B can result in socially
optimal emission. They made clear that the regulator needs to correctly specify the rate
at which a ﬁrm in the market can exchange a permit for a unit of current emission for the
same amount of future emissions. In particular, with stationary abatement and damage
functions over time, a simple one-to-one exchange ratio induces ﬁrms to postpone
emission reduction to the future and therefore is not necessarily consistent with eﬃcient
emission reduction. Leiby and Rubin (2001) conducted a similar analysis for stock
pollutants in a deterministic model, and derived the optimal trading ratio for banking
and borrowing. Yates and Cronshaw (2001) describe a situation where a banking and
borrowing scheme is eﬃciency-enhancing compared to a scheme that does not allow
intertemporal trade of permits. They consider the case for ﬂow pollutants in the
presence of asymmetric information between the regulator and the ﬁrms. They showed
that, if ﬁrms have better information on their abatement costs than the regulator
does, then a banking and borrowing scheme can result in a more eﬃcient outcome
than a scheme which does not allow banking and borrowing since it allows ﬁrms more
ﬂexibility in choosing emission paths.
This paper considers another sort of uncertainty; instead of asymmetric informa-
2tion regarding the pollution abatement cost, the focus is on uncertainty in the pollution
stock accumulation or the future damages. For stock pollution problems such as cli-
mate change and soil or water pollution, we do not have a complete knowledge about
the dynamics of the pollution accumulation. The stock of a pollutant next period
depends not only on controllable emissions due to human activities but also on uncon-
trollable emissions, climate conditions and so on. This study shows that, if there is
such uncertainty in the pollution stock accumulation, then allowing ﬁrms for B&B may
result in ineﬃciency. In particular, it is crucial whether or not the regulator commits
to the amount of bankable permits to polluters which the regulator announces in the
initial period. With deterministic stock accumulation, it suﬃces for the regulator to
specify the total allowable amount of emissions over time and a trading ratio for bank-
ing and borrowing of permits at the initial period (Yates and Cronshaw 2001). With
uncertainty about pollution accumulation, however, the regulator may not be able to
achieve socially optimal accumulation of the pollutant if the regulator commits to the
initial allocation of permits to ﬁrms. A market equilibrium without B&B is in fact
superior to the one with B&B. Before giving a formal description of this claim, let us
see the intuition behind it. Suppose that a regulator must choose the total amount
of emission to be allowed over time by each ﬁrm in the initial period. If banking and
borrowing are allowed, ﬁrms decide how much emission to discharge, how much to
trade in the permit market, and how much to bank for or borrow from the permits in
the future periods. For a stock pollutant whose accumulation involves uncertainty, the
regulator needs to update the allowable amount of emission over time. However, this is
not possible if the regulator needs to commit to the amount of permits given to ﬁrms
in the initial period. On the other hand, if the regulator updates the allowable amount
of emissions by ﬁrms in each period, a permit becomes a risky asset: its price and the
amount will not be deterministic from the ﬁrms’ point of view, and they need to make
permit trading decisions under uncertainty. This paper gives a formal explanation of
this argument and discusses what a regulator should do, at each point in time, in or-
der to achieve eﬃcient stock pollution accumulation while allowing ﬁrms to engage in
banking and borrowing of permits.
Section 2 introduces a two-period model of tradable permit markets for the emission
of a stock pollutant. We compare the eﬃciency of the outcomes in two cases; a market
without B&B and a market with B&B where the regulator commits to the initial
allocation of permits to ﬁrms. It will be shown that (1) if there is no uncertainty, both
3schemes yield eﬃcient pollution accumulation (Proposition 1); (2) with uncertainty
about the pollution accumulation, a market without B&B can achieve eﬃcient pollution
accumulation (Proposition 2); and (3) a market with B&B does not yield an eﬃcient
outcome (Proposition 3). An alternative banking and borrowing scheme, where the
regulator has ﬂexibility in reallocating permits to ﬁrms over time is introduced and
shown to be eﬃcient with correctly speciﬁed policy parameters (Proposition 4). Section
3 discusses the main ﬁnding and the policy implications.
2 The model
2.1 Model Enviroment
We introduce a two-period model of a tradable permit market for the emission of a
stock pollutant with N polluting ﬁrms. As in Montgomery (1972) and Kwerel (1977),
the focus is on the partial equilibrium in a tradable permit market; the economic
decisions by the market participants outside the permit market (other output and
input decisions) are omitted. Here the assumptions of the model are listed, and the
market and intertemporal trade (banking and borrowing scheme) are deﬁned in the
next subsection. After characterizing the eﬃcient emission across periods (2.3), this
section concludes with the comparison of the eﬃcient emission and the market outcomes
under diﬀerent speciﬁcations on banking and borrowing (2.4).
Let I ≡{ 1,...,N} be the set of the ﬁrms and Ci : IR + → IR be the periodwise
emission reduction cost function of i ∈ I. Denote the emission by ﬁrm i in period t
by eit ∈ IR + and total (industrial) emissions in period t by et =

i∈I eit. Ci(eit)i s
the cost of reducing (achieving) emissions eit at time t. Vector ei =( ei1,e i2) is the
emissions path by ﬁrm i. Throughout the paper we assume
Assumption 1 Ci is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with derivatives −C 
i,C  
i > 0
for all i ∈ I.
For simplicity, suppose Ci is time-invariant. Changes in {Ci} across time do not aﬀect
our result. Under Assumption 1, the periodwise industry cost function C : IR + → IR
deﬁned by








4is continuously diﬀerentiable with −C ,C   > 0 and C (E)=C 
i(ei) for all i ∈ I where
{ei}i∈I solves (IC). This industry cost function is used later to characterize the eﬃcient
emission path.1
Let Dt(St) be the damage in period t caused by the pollution stock St. Assume
Assumption 2 Dt : IR + → I R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with bounded deriva-
tives D 
t > 0,D  
t ≥ 0 for t =1 ,2.
Suppose that the equation of motion of the stock pollutant is given by
St = γtSt−1 + et (1)
where 1−γt ∈ [0,1] represents the natural rate of decay of the pollution in the air. The
decay rate γt is a random variable with probability measure P and support Γ ⊆ [0,1].
Fluctuation in γt may be due to the eﬀect of climatic conditions or non-point sources
of emissions that are independent of the industry in consideration.2 Without loss of
generality let S0 = 0. Then the pollution stock dynamics is given by
S1 = e1,S 2 = γ2S1 + e2.
It is assumed that the regulator observes the realization of γt at the beginning of period
t. Since there is only one random variable, denote γt by γ in what follows. γ denotes
a random variable, and a particular realization of γ will be denoted by, say, ¯ γ.
In this model, the only source of uncertainty is in the accumulation of the stock pol-
lutant. More generally, the conclusion of the analysis holds true if the future damages
are uncertain. For simplicity this study focuses on stock accumulation uncertainty.
The following assumption on a discount factor is also maintained throughout the
paper.
Assumption 3 The regulator and N ﬁrms have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1].
1See Kwerel (1977) for the property and the use of industry cost function in analyzing environmental
policies.
2Estimates of γ for CO2 range from 0.99 to 0.995 (Hoel and Karp 2001).
Here the uncertainty is represented by a multiplicative shock in this model. Alternatively, one can assume
an additive shock: St+1 =¯ γ(St + εt + et) where ¯ γ is deterministic and εt is a random variable. The main
result of this paper holds with this alternative speciﬁcation as well.
52.2 Bankable permit markets and non-bankable permit
markets
Suppose the regulator knows the true cost functions of the ﬁrms, the damage function
at each period, and the dynamics of the pollution stock accumulation. Given N ﬁrms’
cost minimizing behaviors, a regulator seeks to minimize the sum of the abatement
cost and the damage. We consider two market-based policy instruments to increase
welfare. The description of these instruments are embedded in the following deﬁnitions
of the corresponding market equilibria.
Deﬁnition 1 [Non-Bankable Permit Market Equilibrium]
Given the total number of permits for each period and each contingency L1 =

i∈I li1
and L2(S1, ¯ γ)=

i∈I li2(S1,¯ γ) for all ¯ γ ∈ Γ and all S1 ≥ 0, a non-bankable market
equilibrium consists of permit prices q =( q1,(q2(S1, ¯ γ))S1≥0,¯ γ∈Γ) and an allocation of




i2(S1, ¯ γ))S1≥0,¯ γ∈Γ}), such that
(i) (Firms’ cost minimization) Given q and li, e∗





and, for each S1 ≥ 0 and ¯ γ ∈ Γ, e∗
i2(S1, ¯ γ) solves the cost minimization problem under
state (S1, ¯ γ):
min
ei2(S1,¯ γ)≥0
Ci(ei2(S1, ¯ γ)) + q2(ei2(S1, ¯ γ) − li2(S1, ¯ γ))




i∈I ei1 and L2(S1, ¯ γ)=

i∈I ei2(S1, ¯ γ) for all S1 ≥ 0 and all ¯ γ ∈ Γ.
IE in the above deﬁnition denotes the expected value operator with respect to
P. Deﬁnition 1 corresponds to a period by period tradable pollution permit scheme
without banking and borrowing. The regulator speciﬁes the total number of permits Lt
for each period and each contingency (i.e. each realization (S1, ¯ γ)).3 Correspondingly,
the market clearing condition is deﬁned for each period and each contingency. The
order of move is as follows: at the beginning of period 1 the regulator announces the
allocation of period-1 emission permits {li}i∈I, and ﬁrms decide how much emission to
3For our analysis, the initial distribution of the permits among ﬁrms does not matter.
6discharge (and how many permits to purchase or sell) in period 1. At the beginning
of period 2 the regulator realizes the period-1 emission S1 and some ¯ γ, and announces
the period-2 emission permits {li2(S1,¯ γ)}i∈I. Then the ﬁrms make the emission and
trading decisions.
Deﬁnition 2 describes a permit market equilibrium where banking and borrowing
of permits are allowed.
Deﬁnition 2 [Bankable Permit Market Equilibrium (with Fixed Permit Allocation)]
Given a conversion coeﬃcient for banking and borrowing θ ∈ IR + and θ-weighted sum





for any arbitrary L1 =

i li1 ≥ 0,L 2 =

i li2 ≥ 0 that satisfy (2), a bankable market











Ci(ei1)+q1xi + δ[Ci(ei2)+q2{θ(ei1 − li1 − xi)+ei2 − li2}] (3)











With banking and borrowing, the regulator speciﬁes the conversion rate for banked
or borrowed permits (θ) and the weighted sum of the permits across time (L(θ)). As
Yates and Cronshaw (2001) argue, these two parameters are the regulator’s choice
variables for a two-period bankable market. Correspondingly, the market clearing
condition is deﬁned for the weighted sum of permits across time. With bankable
permits, ﬁrm i can save or borrow the diﬀerence between the emission and the initial
allocation plus the purchased permit bi ≡ (ei1 − li1 − xi) for the use in period 2.
The eﬀective amount of permit carried to period 2 is given by θbi. Notice that each
individual ﬁrm’s problem is static without B&B and dynamic with B&B.4 In the above
4The model here does not consider investment on pollution abatement capital (e.g. a gas turbine with
less CO2 emission per cycle) by ﬁrms. If we consider such investment, a ﬁrm’s problem will be dynamic even
without banking and borrowing of permits. See Conclusion for further discussion.
7deﬁnition, the regulator announces the allocation of permits to each ﬁrm and the
conversion rate for banking and borrowing at the beginning of period 1, and commits
to the announced allocation until the end of period 2. Therefore, it is called a bankable
market equilibrium with ﬁxed permit allocation.
In what follows we characterize the eﬃcient emission paths.
2.3 Eﬃcient emission paths
Given the structure of the costs and the damages, we can solve for the eﬃcient (least
cost) emission path in the following manner.
(Step 1) Given the pollution stock at the end of period 1, S1, and a realized rate of
decay ¯ γ ∈ Γ, solve for the optimal emission in period 2:
V2(S1, ¯ γ) = min
e2≥0
{C(e2)+D2(¯ γS1 + e2)}
Given the convexity of C and D2, the following ﬁrst order condition is necessary and
suﬃcient for an interior solution:
C (e2)+D 
2(¯ γS1 + e2)=0 . (4)
Denote the solution by e∗
2(S1, ¯ γ)).















2(e1,γ))} =0 6 (5)
The solution to the above dynamic problem gives us the optimal emission rule
(e∗
1,e ∗
2(S1, ¯ γ)S1≥0,¯ γ∈Γ),
5Given the convexity of C and D1, V2 is convex.
6Since D 







8which is in a feedback form. Note that an optimal emission path is deﬁned for each
realization of S1,γ and pollution stock at the end of period 1; depending on those
values, the optimal emission in period 2 will be diﬀerent.A particular optimal emission
path, given ¯ γ ∈ Γ, will be (e∗
1,e ∗
2(e∗
1, ¯ γ)). In what follows we will see whether the two
market schemes deﬁned in the previous subsection yield the eﬃcient outcome.
2.4 Welfare properties of tradable permits with and with-
out B &B
Now we examine whether these market-based instruments result in diﬀerent outcomes.
First we have
Proposition 1 7 If the emissions are deterministic (i.e. γ ≡ ¯ γ almost surely for some






















2) is the eﬃcient emission path) is eﬃcient.
Proof. Here we sketch the proof for an interior solution. With the pollution stock
being deterministic, the eﬃcient emission path (e∗
1,e ∗
2) is unique and given by a solution
to the following system of equations:
C (e∗
1)+D (e∗












it for all t =1 ,2.




7This result is a corollary to a theorem proved by Montgomery (1972); the theorem implies that the
market prices for pollutants with distinct pollution eﬀects should be diﬀerent in general. The claim and the





q1 = δq2θ. (8)
Set θ as in equation (6), q1 as in equation (8) and
q2 = D (¯ γe∗
1 + e∗
2).
Then any emission vector {eit} that satisﬁes the market equilibrium conditions satisfy
the conditions for eﬃcient emissions.
Therefore, in a deterministic world the market with banking and borrowing results in
eﬃciency. The following proposition asserts that a non-bankable permit market equilib-
rium allocation is eﬃcient with correctly speciﬁed state-contingent permit allocation
and, conversely, an eﬃcient pollution can be supported as an equilibrium pollution
regardless of uncertainty in the pollution.





2(S1,γ) for all γ ∈ Γ. With such L∗
1 and (L∗
2(S1,γ))γ∈Γ,a n
eﬃcient level of emissions can be supported as an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. This follows immediately from the deﬁnition of a non-bankable permit mar-
ket equilibrium.
Note that, without banking and borrowing, the regulator can choose the amount
of permits for period 2 after observing the realization of the stock at the end of period
1. Therefore, the two market schemes are equivalent in the deterministic case. Given
p1 = δθp2, ﬁrms face the same cost minimization problem under the two schemes and
the regulator’s problem is also the same. Since the ﬁrms choose the same emission path
in both cases, the argument that B&B gives ﬁrms more ﬂexibility and lowers ﬁrms’
cost burden does not apply in this case.
With uncertainty in the pollution stock, the two schemes may result in diﬀerent
outcomes. In particular, as the following proposition states, a bankable market with
ﬁxed permit allocation may have a suboptimal pollution outcome.
Proposition 3 If the pollution stock is uncertain, then the expected welfare under a
bankable market equilibrium with ﬁxed permit allocation is less than or equal to the
welfare under an eﬃcient non-bankable market equilibrium.
10Proof. Under B&B with a ﬁxed permit allocation, the regulator faces a version of
Ramsey’s optimal policy problem where the regulator chooses the permit conversion





s.t. S1 = e1,
S2 = γS1 + e2 for all γ ∈ Γ,
C (e1) − δθC (e2)=0 , (9)




Equations (9) and (10) represent the necessary and suﬃcient conditions that the emis-
sion satisﬁes in a bankable market equilibrium (the ’implementability constraint’ in the
optimal taxation literature). Denote the solution to this problem by (θ∗∗,L ∗∗,e ∗∗
1 ,e ∗∗
2 ).
Solving the above constrained minimization problem, one obtains the following neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions:
C (e1)+D 
1(e1)+δIE{γD 
2(γe1 +e 2)} = 0 (11)
and
C (e2)+I E {D 
2(γe1 +e 2)} = 0 (12)
if (9) is not binding; if it is binding, then
C (e2)+I E {D 
2(γe1 +e 2)} +
C  (e2)C (e1)[C (e1)+D  
1(e1)+I E {γD 
2(γe1 +e 2)}]





2 (γ ) for all all γ,γ  ∈ Γ: in a non-bankable permit market
equilibrium, the period-2 emissions cannot be diﬀerentiated for diﬀerent contingencies.
By Proposition 2, the ﬁrst-order conditions for a non-bankable market equilibrium
emissions are necessary and suﬃcient for eﬃciency. In particular, we must have
C (e2)+D 
2(¯ γe1 + e2(e1, ¯ γ)) = 0 (14)
for each realization ¯ γ ∈ Γ. Whether or not constraint (9) is binding, period-2 emission
e∗∗
2 does not satisfy (14). This concludes our proof.
11The intuition behind this result is as follows. The market clearing condition for a
bankable permit market involves the weighted sum of the emissions in multiple periods.
The regulator needs to set the total number of permits and the conversion factor prior
to period 1, when γ is uncertain. With the non-bankable permit market scheme, on
the other hand, the regulator is able to set the total number of permits in period 2
following the realization of γ.
Note that the market scheme without B&B is more consistent with Bellman’s prin-
ciple of optimality. It allows the regulator to set the total amount of permits at each
point in time as a feedback strategy contingent on the realized beginning-of-period
pollution stock and the rate of decay. On the other hand, a bankable permit market
equilibrium with ﬁxed permit allocation is analogous to an equilibrium with incom-
plete markets. The regulator cannot choose the period 2 total emission contingent on
the information available at the beginning of period 2. The degree of freedom in the
instrument choice is larger without banking and borrowing, and a non-bankable per-
mit market scheme utilizes available information more fully than the bankable permit
market scheme. This leads to a higher expected welfare with a non-bankable permit
market.
The following deﬁnition describes an alternative banking and borrowing scheme
where the regulator allows for intertemporal trade of permits but does not commit to
the initial allocation of permits to ﬁrms.
Deﬁnition 3 [Bankable Permit Market Equilibrium with Flexible Permit Allocation]
Given a conversion coeﬃcient for banking and borrowing θ ∈ IR + and state-contingent
θ-weighted sum of permits {L(θ,S1,¯ γ)}¯ γ∈Γ deﬁned by




for any arbitrary L1 =

i li1 ≥ 0,L 2(S1, ¯ γ)=

i li2(S1, ¯ γ) ≥ 0 that satisfy (15),
a bankable market equilibrium consists of permit prices q =( q1,(q2(S1, ¯ γ))S1≥0,¯ γ∈Γ),
emissions {e∗
i1,(e∗
i2(S1,¯ γ))S1≥0,¯ γ∈Γ}i∈I and permit purchases {x∗
i}i∈I such that







12for all i ∈ I,










In words, the regulator speciﬁes the conversion coeﬃcient θ prior to period 1; how-
ever, the regulator announces each ﬁrm’s endowment of the period-2 emission permit
at the beginning of period 2 given a realization of the period-1 emission and the rate
of decay. As in the following proposition, the above banking and borrowing scheme
yields an eﬃcient pollution outcome if θ and L are speciﬁed correctly.
Proposition 4 A bankable market equilibrium with ﬂexible permit allocation is eﬃ-























2(S1, ¯ γ))S1≥0,¯ γ∈Γ) is the eﬃcient emission path.
Proof. Here we sketch the proof for an interior solution. Given θ and {L(θ,S1, ¯ γ)}¯ γ∈Γ,
(q,e,x) is an equilibrium if and only if it satisﬁes the following system of equations.
C 
i(ei1)+δθIEq2(S1,γ) = 0 for all i ∈ I, (19)
q1 = δθIEq2(S1,γ), (20)
C 









ei2(S1, ¯ γ) for all ¯ γ ∈ Γ. (22)
Set θ∗ and L∗ as in (17) and (18), and let q2(S1,¯ γ)=D 
2(¯ γe∗
1 +e∗
2(S1, ¯ γ)) for all ¯ γ ∈ Γ
and q1 as in (20). Then any e that satisﬁes (19) - (22) satisﬁes (4) and (5), the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the eﬃcient emission.
13The above proposition suggests that, if the regulator has ﬂexibility in updating the
total allowable emission over time, then allowing for banking and borrowing of permits
can be consistent with eﬃciency. Together with Proposition 2 and 3, it reveals the
importance of the regulatory ﬂexibility when the intertemporal trading of permits is
allowed.
By Proposition 2 and 4, we see that the eﬃcient emission can be achieved by a
tradable permit market with and without banking and borrowing. Two remarks are
in order. First, as discussed in Leiby and Rubin (2001), the conversion coeﬃcient
θ must be correctly speciﬁed. The calculation of the optimal conversion coeﬃcient




1,γ))γ∈Γ). Secondly, in order for Proposition 4 to be valid,
ﬁrms need to have a correct belief on how the regulator updates L2(S1,γ). In order
to achieve the eﬃcient emission in a bankable permit market, the regulator needs to
know the correct distribution of γ. At the same time, ﬁrms must know how q2(S1,γ)
is distributed. Without banking and borrowing, on the other hand, ﬁrms’ problems
are time- and state-separable and hence deterministic in eﬀect. In period 1, ﬁrms can
solve for cost-minimizing period-1 emission without knowing what q2 or L2 will be in
period 2. Similarly, the choice of e2 in period 2 is not aﬀected by the choice in period
1. In this sense, a permit market with banking and borrowing demands that ﬁrms have
more information than a permit market without banking and borrowing.
3 Conclusion
We compared the eﬃciency of tradable pollution permits with and without banking and
borrowing of the permits for discharging a stock pollutant. The result here suggests
that a bankable permit market scheme is inferior to a non-bankable permit market
scheme if, for any reason, (1) the revision of the total number of permits is needed
for eﬃciency as uncertainty is resolved over time (2) while the regulator does not
have ﬂexibility to revise it. This study considered uncertainty in the pollution stock
dynamics, but the inferiority of a bankable permit market with ﬁxed permit allocation
holds for a wider range of cases (e.g. when the regulator learns about the distribution
of random pollution dynamics and future damages over time).
We considered a tradable market scheme without banking and borrowing where
the regulator is able to set the total amount of permits in each period. The ﬁrms may
14react strategically given the regulator’s periodic update of the policy. An interesting
case is where ﬁrms make investment decisions to install some pollution-abatement
equipment. Depending on the way the regulator updates its policy, ﬁrms may not
choose the optimal amount of investment.8 Examinations of such strategic moves
await future research. We also assumed the absence of asymmetric information; the
regulator is assumed to know the correct cost functions of the ﬁrms. The optimal
policy for stock pollutants in the presence of asymmetric information was analyzed
by Benford (1998) and Hoel and Karp (2001). Benford showed that a combined price
and quantity (tax and tradable permit) scheme for a static pollution problem with
asymmetric information, which was ﬁrst analyzed by Kwerel (1977), results in eﬃciency
for a limited class of cost functions. The results here suggest that the result by Yates
and Cronshaw (2001) (superiority of banking and borrowing scheme under asymmetric
information between the regulator and the polluters) will be modiﬁed against banking
and borrowing in the case of a stock pollutant with uncertainty.
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